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中国农学通报

中国农学通报 ›› 2012, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (30): 312-316.doi: 10.11924/j.issn.1000-6850.2012-0244

• 食品 营养 检测 安全 • 上一篇    

基于进化博弈论的食品质量安全监管分析

李宗泰 何忠伟   

  • 收稿日期:2012-01-31 修回日期:2012-03-05 出版日期:2012-10-25 发布日期:2012-10-25
  • 基金资助:

    北京哲学社科规划重点项目“基于供应链的北京农产品质量安全管理模式研究”

Analysis on Food quality and safety supervision based on Evolutional Game Theory

  • Received:2012-01-31 Revised:2012-03-05 Online:2012-10-25 Published:2012-10-25

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摘要：

摘 要：运用进化博弈理论分析食品质量安全监管问题。通过食品质量安全演化博弈模型的构建和分析，探讨食品生产经营者和监管者的策略空间以及演化趋势，得出食品质量安全监管的演化相图以及在每一个平衡点的演化稳定特性，很好地揭示了食品质量安全监管的演化进程，为有效制定相关政策保障食品质量安全提供了科学依据。

关键词: 金堂县, 金堂县

Abstract:

Abstract: The paper analyzes food quality and safety supervision based on evolutional game theory. By building and analyzing the evolutional game model of food quality safety, it discuss the strategic space and evolutional trend of producers, business operators and supervisions. it can conclude the evolutional phase of food quality safety and evolutional stability at each equilibrium point. The evolutional progress of food quality safety supervision will be presented well. it will provide some scientific viewpoints of efficient policy to safeguard food quality safety.