Abstract:

This paper is mainly to analysis the liability incentives of the main body of the supply chain in the traceability system, and provides a framework for empirical analysis. This paper develops a formal model of how, by making liability feasible, traceability causes the degree of food safety to increase. This paper model a stylized marketing chain composed of farmers, marketers, firms and consumers，use of comparative static approach to analysis the supply chain responsibility to stimulate the body. The model explores in detail the relationships between traceability and the provision of food safety: The greater the degree of the main efforts and the greater are the liability incentives to supply safer food; the higher the levels of traceability and the greater the liability incentives to supply safer food; the larger the number of farmers, marketers and firms its responsibility to provide safe food incentive is smaller, then the larger the number of farmers, marketers and firms, the larger is the free-rider problem and the greater are the liability incentives to supply safer food provided by increase the traceability. The model captures some important features of the creation of liability incentives through better traceability. And a potential consequence of the current trend in seeking better traceability is an increase in vertical coordination and integration.