欢迎访问《中国农学通报》,

中国农学通报 ›› 2015, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (14): 114-118.doi: 10.11924/j.issn.1000-6850.casb14120079

• 食品 营养 检测 安全 • 上一篇    下一篇

食品供需网可追溯体系构建的博弈分析

何 静,马 青   

  1. (上海海洋大学经济管理学院,上海 201306)
  • 收稿日期:2014-12-11 修回日期:2015-03-19 接受日期:2015-03-31 出版日期:2015-06-02 发布日期:2015-06-02
  • 通讯作者: 何静
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学规划项目“食品供需网理念加速推进我国食品安全可追溯体系实施的机理研究”(13YJA630028);上海市教育委员会科研创新重点项目“基于食品供需网特征理念的食品可追溯体系实施机理研究”(13ZS099);上海海洋大学经济管理学院基金项目“目标利润与安全控制协同的食品供需网可追溯系统运作机制研究”(JG2015-1)。

Game Analysis of Traceability System Construction of FSDN

He Jing, Ma Qing   

  1. (School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Ocean University, Shanghai 201306)
  • Received:2014-12-11 Revised:2015-03-19 Accepted:2015-03-31 Online:2015-06-02 Published:2015-06-02

摘要: 为突出食品供需网(FSDN)理念在可追溯体系构建上的优势,论文构建了食品供应链的Nash博弈均衡模型与食品供需网的Pareto博弈均衡模型,分析2种情况下企业构建食品可追溯体系的投入水平。结果发现在食品供应链中,企业在政策、法规等强制约束下会对可追溯体系的构建有一定的投入,但是投入水平较低。在食品供需网中,由Pareto均衡模型得出,企业对可追溯体系构建的投入高于Nash均衡水平。因此,食品供需网的构建可提高企业可追溯体系构建的投入水平,促使企业主动参与可追溯体系的构建和实施。

关键词: 种植业, 种植业, 面源污染, 调查

Abstract: To emphasize the advantage in constructing the traceability system in FSDN, this paper constructed the Nash game equilibrium model in food supply chain and the Pareto game equilibrium model in FSDN, and analyzed the input level of constructing traceability system of enterprises in the two models. The results showed that enterprises in food supply chain would invest at a low level in food safety under the mandatory constraint of policy and regulation. In the Pareto equilibrium model, enterprises in FSDN would input at a higher level in food safety construction than in the Nash equilibrium level. Therefore FSDN would make enterprises improve the input level of constructing the traceability system, and promote the enterprises’ active participating in the construction and implementation of traceability system.