欢迎访问《中国农学通报》，
中国农学通报

中国农学通报 ›› 2015, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (13): 279-283.doi: 10.11924/j.issn.1000-6850.casb15020019

所属专题： 现代农业发展与乡村振兴

• 三农研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

完全信息静态博弈下农业保险分析——以甘肃省为例

姚飞,吴应珍   

  1. 甘肃农业大学人文学院,甘肃农业大学人文学院
  • 收稿日期:2015-02-03 修回日期:2015-03-12 接受日期:2015-03-16 出版日期:2015-06-02 发布日期:2015-06-02
  • 通讯作者: 吴应珍
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目 “西北欠发达地区循环农业法律制度建设研究” (10BFX079)。

Agricultural Insurance Analysis Under the Complete Information Static Game——Taking Gansu Province As An Example

  • Received:2015-02-03 Revised:2015-03-12 Accepted:2015-03-16 Online:2015-06-02 Published:2015-06-02

PDF (PC)

481

摘要： 为促进甘肃省农业保险政策的完善及提高农户对农业保险的有效需求，进而促进甘肃省农业保险的可持续发展，本研究针对农业保险市场上政府、保险公司和农户三大利益主体之间的相互影响关系，采用完全信息静态博弈理论对各个利益主体的收益进行博弈分析，同时结合甘肃省实地调研数据，选取逻辑回归分析方法提取影响农户参与农业保险的主要因素。分析得出：在保险公司和农户的博弈中，保险公司在农户有投保意愿时应当做出的积极回应为不经营策略，如果选择经营，则会损失更多(-M-P+C<0)，其中，C为农户的投保金额，M为出险后农户获得的保险金，P为保险公司的经营成本；农户在保险公司做出经营策略的时候，应当积极投保，这样才能获得收益，如果保险公司选择不经营，农户无论做出什么选择，都会损失预防灾情的资金N，并且如果农户选择投保还会损失更多；在政府与保险公司的博弈中，可以看出，政府的最佳收益为0，说明政府不支持保险公司进行农业保险业务是最佳策略；而对保险公司来说，只有在政府支持的情况下，才能获得最佳收益（-M-P C Q)，其中，Q表示政府对保险公司的支持成本，这说明，只有在政府支持的情况下，保险公司经营农业保险的积极性才能提高。逻辑回归分析表明文化程度、务农人数、耕地面积、农业收入占家庭收入比重、了解农业保险程度对农户农业保险购买行为具有显著的影响。

关键词: 烤烟, 烤烟, 光合特性, 施氮量, 留叶数

Abstract: In order to perfect the policy of Gansu agricultural insurance, improve the farmers’ effective demand for agricultural insurance and then promote the sustainable development of Gansu agricultural insurance. This research analyzes the profits of the major interest subjects in agricultural insurance market by constructing the complete information static game model, which is based on the interplay among the government, insurance companies and farmers. And combined with the survey data of Gansu province, this research concludes the main factors which influence farmers to buy agricultural insurance by constructing Logistic regression analysis model. The conclusion is that in the game between insurance companies and farmers the positive response for insurance companies is not to operate agricultural insurance when farmers have insured-willingness, if the insurance companies choose to operate agricultural insurance, it will cost more(-M-P C<0), C is insurance expenses of farmers, M is farmer’s insurance claim, P is insurance company’s operational cost; farmers should be active to insure to take profits when insurance companies choose to operate agricultural insurance, farmers would definitely cost N to prevent the disaster when insurance companies choose not to operate agricultural insurance and farmers would cost more if they choose to insure agricultural insurance; in the game between the government and insurance companies, the government’s best interest is 0 and the government’s optimal strategy is not to support the insurance company to operate agricultural insurance; but insurance companies will get the best interest (-M-P C Q)(Q is government’s cost to support insurance company) only when the government support agricultural insurance, so the insurance companies will not improve the enthusiasm to operate agricultural insurance unless the government provide support. Logistic regression analysis proves that farmer’s education degree, the number of farming in a family, farmland area, agricultural income proportion and the knowledge about agricultural insurance mainly influence farmers’ behavior to purchase agricultural insurance.