Abstract: The study aims to bring famer’ s“bounded rationality”into the government’ s management frame of farmers’behavior about agricultural non-point source pollution and offer policy reference for the government’ s control of agricultural non- point source pollution. Based on farmer behavioral“collective performance”in urban and rural balancing development and used the method of“replicator dynamics” , the author studied the evolutionary process of famers’behavior controlled by non- point pollution and analyzed the effect of government on famers’behavior process from original state to“replicator dynamics”under the assumption of “bounded rationality” . The results showed that the famers’production activities and living behavior controlled by agricultural non-point source pollution became random under“bounded rationality” , but in the long-term game with the government, this behavior had“evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)” . The government should take active action to accelerate ESS and adopt measures to stimulate famers to take production activities and living behavior which can make discharge from agricultural non-point source pollution reach the standard.