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中国农学通报

中国农学通报 ›› 2011, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (29): 199-203.

所属专题： 现代农业发展与乡村振兴

• 三农问题研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

农村非正规金融存续与发展的博弈分析——基于金融生态主体发展失衡的视角

乔立娟 赵桂玲 王文青 杜英娜   

  • 收稿日期:2011-05-04 修回日期:2011-06-20 出版日期:2011-11-15 发布日期:2011-11-15
  • 基金资助:

    统筹城乡发展视角下河北省农村金融生态评价与优化路径研究;河北省农村社会养老保险问题及对策研究;保定市农业产业化进程中农业保险的需求研究

Game Theory Analysis of the Existence and Development of Rural Informal Finance-from the Perspective of Rural Financial Ecology Uneven Development

  • Received:2011-05-04 Revised:2011-06-20 Online:2011-11-15 Published:2011-11-15

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摘要：

从中国农村金融生态主体非均衡发展的视角构建分析框架，为优化农村金融生态主体行为提供理论借鉴。通过不完全信息动态博弈法对农村金融生态主体行为进行分析，并寻找地方政府、非正规金融机构以及各类借款人的最优均衡。指出地方政府在农村非正规金融的形成与发展中的重要作用。而由于博弈次数与惩罚力度的不同，农村借款人的策略选择也影响到农村非正规金融业务的开展。最后，对农村金融生态主体的选择进行分析，并提出合理的对策建议。

关键词: 中国, 中国, 梨, 生产, 贸易, 竞争力

Abstract:

Under the viewing angle of the entities of rural financial ecology uneven development, the paper constructed analytical framework, and offered reference on optimization the behavior of the entities of rural financial ecology. Using the dynamic game theory with imperfect information, the entities behavior of rural financial ecology was analyzed, and the optimal equilibrium between the local government, informal finance and types of borrowers were found. The important role of local government in the formation and development of rural informal finance was point out. Because of the difference of the game times and punishment for dishonesty, the strategy selection of the rural borrowers also affect the development of rural informal finance. At last, the strategy selection of the entities of rural financial ecology was analyzed, and reasonable countermeasures were offered.

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